John Woolley and Charles Badham: in Defence of the Soul of Culture by Melleuish, Gregory & University of Wollongong, Department of History and Politics,
John Woolley and Charles Badham: 
in Defence of the Soul of Culture 
GREGORY MELLEUISH* 
In recent years there has been in Australia, as elsewhere, an 
interesting battle regarding the meaning and significance of culturel . 
This battle has taken many forms but the basic division has been 
most succinctly expressed by Alain Finkielkraut: 
In effect the term 'culture' now has two meanings. The frrstasserts 
the pre-eminence of the life of thought; the second denies this: 
from everyday gestures to the great creations of the human spirit, 
is not everything cultural? Why should we give pride of place 
to the latter rather than the former, to the life of thought rather 
than the art of knitting, or the chewing of betel nuts, or the ancestral 
custom of dunking one's buttered toast in the morning cup of 
coffee?2 
Against the background of this conflict there has developed 
another dispute revolving around the question of humanism as 
opposed to anti-humanism and the proper place of the university 
in the contemporary world. During the course of the last century 
an association has grown up linking humanism, culture and the 
univerSity. In recent times this association has perhaps become 
more of an article of faith and a rhetorical tool than a reasonably 
argued position, but it remains the case that many people continue 
to view the university as the prime carrier of the values exemplified 
by the ideals of humanism and culture. 
This association of humanism, culture and the university has 
recently come under attack from both the left and the right. John 
Carroll's recent onslaught on humanism as an ideal that has 
led western culture down the road of nihilism is matched by his 
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pessimistic view of the humanistic university3. From the left Ian 
Hunter has mounted an anti-humanist critique of the humanist 
conception of the university based on Foucault and a reading of 
European history that emphasizes the disciplinary and regulative 
nature of the state4. 
To an extent this resurgence of anti-humanism is directed 
against that decadent offspring of humanism-Romanticism. But 
like the earlier anti-humanist T. E. Hulme they recognize that 
behind the extravagances of Romanticism there stands humanism 
as the original source of the problem. For anti-humanists, the 
humanist ideal is soft and flabby and in need of being corrected by 
something tougher and more substantial. Against the decadence of 
humanism Carroll pits the ideas of the Law and the Sacred as 
sources of authority for human culture. Fearful of the excesses of 
private jUdgement, Ian Hunter has emphasized the need for 
bureaucratic regulation of the ethical. From their differing political 
positions both Carroll and Hunter find similar things to condemn in 
humanism: free will, private judgement, its lack of an objective 
authority and its belief that individuals are capable of drawing on 
their internal spiritual resources in determining the choices they 
make. 
Moreover both Carroll and Hunter have made the university a 
focus of their attacks, as the primary humanist institution in the 
modem world. Both believe that the autonomous liberal humanist 
university founded on the ideal of culture has failed. Carroll would 
replace it with an institution that would use its authority to teach 
'the Law'; Hunter would happily accept the idea that the university 
should become an arm of the state devoted to producing those sorts 
of people that the state deems desirable. These critiques cannot be 
countered simply by invoking the traditional ideal of the university; 
to quote Newman back to Hunter or Carroll is simply to engage in 
a dialogue of the deaf. Instead I believe that it is necessary to re-
consider and re-think the whole question of the culture-humanism-
university association to see the extent to which it can still be 
defended. 
Any consideration of the relationship between the university 
and culturelhumanism cannot proceed without a proper appreciation 
of the history of that relationship. Ian Hunter made a fairly 
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successful attack on the pretensions of the contemporary university 
by arguing that historically universities have been neither particularly 
liberal nor concerned with 'sweetness and light'. One of Hunter's 
collaborators in his Accounting for the Humanities volume, Bruce 
Smith, attempted to extend this analysis to Australia by applying it 
to the nineteenth century university and, in particular, the University 
of Sydney. Smith argues that despite the rhetoric of its founders 
and early supporters, the objectives of the University of Sydney 
have always been social and 'governmental' rather than cultural 
and intellectual. In particular Smith singles out the two objectives 
summed up in the title 'Crime and the Classics': the 'ethical 
formation of a self-disciplined governor' (83) and the creation of 
a universal primary education system 'to combat criminality' (89). 
Smith sums up his case succinctly: 
The Australian university was formed ... to both train an elite in 
the moral and political skills necessary for effective government, 
and to co-ordinate and lead efforts to educate the population 
away from criminality and towards order and virtue.5 
This somewhat functional view of the origins of the University of 
Sydney is far removed from the traditional self-understanding that 
the University developed of both its origins and its continuing place 
in the world. This is a self-understanding conceived in social, cultural 
and ultimately spiritual terms. It has been summed up most recently 
by Dorothy Green: 
Anderson, Charles Badham, John Woolley, all in their different 
ways perceived the university as charged with the fostering of a 
public spirit. In an era of blind individualism they asserted that 
love of God was inseparable from love of one's neighbour, or to 
put it in religious terms, they asserted the unity of the mystical 
body of Christ daily recrucified.6 
In a way the two positions are not necessarily at odds with each 
other; both emphasize the desire to attain virtue or the good and 
both believe that the university has a public role to play in pursuit 
of that virtue. Where they differ is regarding the way in which the 
university is to work towards this goal. For the anti-humanist the 
university is a functional part of the state apparatus using bureaucratic 
and behavioural techniques to mould, form and train its members 
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so that they can become functional members of the social order. 
For the humanist, and this should be understood to include those 
religious individuals who believe in the transforming power of the 
spirit within, the techniques and discipline of university training 
lead to the awakening of that spirit as the foundation of individual 
autonomy. The conflict is really over the status of the individual 
and his or her capacity to act as a free responsible and spiritual 
entity. Even at its best anti-humanism is unable to place much trust 
in such an individual, without at least a long programme of ethical 
formation. As such it effectively denies a spiritual dimension to 
human beings. 
This paper argues that to deny or ignore that dimension is to 
create a picture of the university and its origins that is both distorted 
and excessively narrow. While the first two Principals of the 
University of Sydney, John Woolley and Charles Badham, were 
aware of the role of the university in both citizen formation and the 
creation of intellectual diSCipline, these concerns were tempered by 
a proper understanding of human beings as spiritual creatures. This 
is not surprising as both men were products of the Oxford of the 
1830s, of that Oxford that has been described as 'a metaphysical 
reality; a platonic vision where holiness and learning met in 
eternal dialectic" and as an institution that produced men who had 
acquired 'a fastidiousness in exposition and in setting the limit of 
one's enquiry ... a striving for definition or settling the meaning of 
one's words'S. Woolley had mixed mainly in liberal Anglican 
circles; his friend Arthur Stanley was both a disciple of Thomas 
Arnold and a friend of Benjamin Jowett. Ken Cable has called 
Woolley anAustralianF. D. Maurice9• In his sympathies and outlook 
Woolley reminds me of that twentieth-century Australian cleric, 
E. H. Burgmann,· who also combined a spiritual Platonism with 
a concern for social justice. Badham had links with the Oxford 
movement though in Australia he was described as a cleric who had 
become a sceptic10• Moreover Badham devoted his scholarly life to 
the study of Plato and the platonic influence remained with him. 
For both Woolley and Badham the university ideal involved the 
creation of both a more rational and a more spiritual world. In 
many ways Smith is dOing no more than repeating the old Australian 
error of treating genuinely religious people as if they were advocates 
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of a secular rationalism, an error committed by George Nadel in 
his analysis of Woolley and Tim Rowse in discussing Burgmann11. 
If allowed to stand it is an error that leads to a distorted picture of 
the nature of culture and its relationship to the university. 
Nevertheless this does not mean that there was not a rigorous 
and diSCiplined aspect to the ideal of the university and culture. Sir 
Samuel Griffith, for example, recalled Woolley primarily as an 
advocate of the Greek ideal of spoudaios, of being earnest and 
thoroughl2. The role of the university was to teach those disciplines 
that 'conduce to mental vigour and selfrelying thought'13. Charles 
Badham equally desired to produce graduates marked by their 
capacity for clear logical thought. The road to this goal lay through 
textual emendation, and the mental exertion that the analysis of 
grammar and language called forth. Badham believed that the 
university man trained in these techniques would possess a clear 
consciousness, 'full of reverence, refinement and clear-headedness 
... by the very conditions of his discipline temperate in opinion, 
temperate in measures, temperate in demeanour' 14. 
The role of the university most certainly had a 'disciplinary' 
aspect in Smith's and Hunter's sense. Equally both Woolley and 
Badham envisaged that university men would playa central role in 
the life of their society because of the benefits that their education 
had bestowed on them. Woolley believed that the university would 
produce statesmen whose 'practice of life may be regulated by 
fixed and eternal principles' IS. His student, Samuel Griffith, in 
paying tribute to his former teacher, argued that democracy 
'desires to be led by its best men' and that graduates should 
endeavour 'by their conduct in life' to convince the public that a 
university education had made them 'fitter men for conducting the 
affairs of the country' 16. Badham thought that the university would 
produce a class of men possessing a 'trained and true intellect' who 
would determine the standards of culture in the community and 
become the measure of it. They would diffuse the 'blessings of 
civilisation around them'17. For both Woolley and Badham the 
university man had a role to play that was closer to exemplary 
citizen than member of the ruling class. Their comments indicate 
the desire of the university to influence the world around it rather 
than the reality of that influence. 
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Moreover the foundation of that desire rested on more than 
just the mechanical effects of disciplinary training. The rigorous 
disciplinary training they advocated had a goal, a goal that was 
informed by a vision of the true, the good and the beautiful. 
Education would provide the path whereby the university man 
could enter into the higher truths and an awareness of the eternal 
and the immutable. Through the constant exercise of discursive 
reason it is finally possible to go beyond the mechanics of logic 
and enter into the realm of intuitive reason. Both Woolley and 
Badham believed that it was the desire for a higher, more spiritual 
knowledge that guided individuals in their use of discursive reason. 
In a passage on Dante, Badham expressed it this way: 
As to the influence of his love for Beatrice he owed the exaltation 
of his religious convictions, so to Virgil he owed the power of 
learned observation and wise dealing with human life and 
character. Indeed, Virgil was to him the type of human learning 
and trained understanding: and, therefore, as Beatrice was the 
power which superintended and commanded his whole journey, 
Virgil was the watchful and edifying companion of his footstepS.I8 
University men required a 'trained understanding' but it was 
useless unless exercised and guided by 'reason' -to use Coleridge's 
terminology. Badham also believed that poetry was a major 
civilising instrument. The beautiful could rescue humanity from the 
vulgar adoration of wealth and power. Absolute beauty, beauty 
'in and for itself, and capable of holding the soul in beatific 
contemplation and never-ending rapture' is the inspiration guiding 
humanity's sense of morality and harmony. For Badham it is 
beauty that prevents philosophy from becoming 'barren and self-
bewildering logic' and turns its attention to 'moral and practical 
enquiries' 19. 
Woolley also adhered to a dualistic conception of knowledge 
in which Humanity was spurred on by a desire to attain intuitive 
reason, or nous, a state in which things are known 'in their 
undivided essence'20, and attempted to achieve this goal through 
the exercise of discursive reason or logos. Woolley, however, 
following Sir William Hamilton's doctrine that the Absolute is 
unknowable, was sceptical as to whether human beings could 
attain more than an intimation of this perfect form of knowledge. 
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Nevertheless he also provided a model of learning in which the 
desire for wholeness and harmony guides the individual as he 
engages in the task of analysis, of logical and empirical 
investigation. After analysis comes the moment when the jump is 
made to synthesis or an intuitive appreciation of the wholeness of 
things. At this stage: 
the shapeless mass seems suddenly to assume a fonn of exquisite 
proportion ... we understand and feel the symmetry in ourselves; 
our whole soul is absorbed in an awful but delicious sense of 
sympathy.21 
Woolley, however, did not believe that synthesis led to the 
apprehension of absolute truth. Such remained beyond the reach 
of the fallible and limited human mind. Rather one entered into the 
outer chambers of truth where one could feel its presence and be 
guided by it. Nous was important not because it was an achievable 
goal but because, like Beatrice, it was the ideal power that guided 
the individual on his quest through life. This theme of the ideal as 
an unrealisable, eternal spiritual pattern was also developed by a 
successor of Woolley's and Badham's, Mungo MacCallum in his 
analysis of Tennyson's Idylls of the King22. 
Woolley's belief in the ideal as a guiding force also affected 
his picture of human moral development. He argued that human 
moral development goes through three stages. During the first stage 
people look inwards desiring to draw others into the sphere of their 
own self-consciousness. If human beings are to develop properly 
they must move beyond this stage or they remained trapped within 
their own selfishness. LOOking outwards they become more aware 
of others and the need to work for the general good, as they 
expand the range of their benevolence to the welfare of the country 
and to the good of the whole of humanity. In so dOing they become 
increasingly more conscious of others and less conscious of 
themselves. This {X"ocess of movement from individual to universal 
has a positive psychological effect on the person pursuing it as they 
are rewarded by receiving 'ever new and increasing sources of 
interest and happiness'23. Finally the individual arrives at an 
appreciation of the unity of humanity considered in all its 
diverse forms. 
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The process described by Woolley in which the human 
character expands from the narrowness of its particular desires to 
a sympathy with all humanity is almost identical with what later 
liberals would call the growth of 'Personality'. For men such as 
Francis Anderson, Ernest Burgmann and Frederic Eggleston a 
liberal society depended on the capacity of its members to develop 
their wider social sympathies, view the world in a disinterested 
and universal fashion, and will the good. In other words for such 
liberals, as for Woolley, the point of discipline and analysis was to 
provide individuals with the spiritual power that enabled them to 
pursue the good instead of being disciplined and coerced into such 
a pursuit. Hence Woolley spoke of the dawn of the age of the Holy 
Spirit when God would corne back to earth 'in His own pure 
Majesty', of an age in which God will be freely obeyed as the true 
cause of the individual's spirituallife24• 
Personality has long been a target for anti-humanism because it 
seems to place an almost utopian hope in the capacity of indi viduals 
to develop their moral sense and exercise freewill in a positive 
fashion. It does not recognize the essentially limited nature of 
human beings nor their need for authority to guide them. Instead 
it places its faith in the ability of the ideal to stimulate individuals 
to make a choice and expand their sympathy outwards towards 
humanity. Both Badharn and Woolley looked to some sort of higher 
spiritual ideal as such a guide. Badharn looked to the university, 
its studies and its 'devotion to the higher principles and faculties 
in man' as the chief agent preserving civilisation in the colony. In 
a fairly well known passage he advocated culture, 'the thought of 
our permanent humanity and of the ineffaceable identity between 
the soul of the past and the soul of the present', as the ideal to 
guide the colonists and save them from the superficiality and 
charlatanism of the modern age25. It is worth noting that in his 
discussion of culture Badham does indeed talk of the need for 
authority and self-control but it is clear that his idea of culture 
includes some sort of spiritual principle as well. 
John Woolley also sought a spiritual ideal that would counter 
the debilitating effects of modern civilisation and its tendency 
towards superficiality. His ideal was equally to be a source of 
authority to guide the individual soul. But for Woolley the 
53 
achievement of what he termed being 'objectified' into society would 
mean the replacement of external ties founded on wealth and rank 
by ones based on spiritual affinity, and the attainment of humanity's 
highest and most perfect state-love. He argued that this desire to 
achieve the ideal is a primary motivation of human action: 
He is haunted by a continual craving for a higher and higher state, 
which flits before his imagination like a vision from heaven; the 
hope of which redeems the soul from corruption.26 
Just as Badham looked to beauty as that which transforms human 
activity and leads it towards the ideal so Woolley gave a special 
place to the poet as the mediator between the mundane world and 
the divine, ' a specially commissioned interpreter between God and 
man'. Woolley remained convinced that human beings could never 
receive more than an intimation of the divine but needed the hope 
that it provided to bear the burdens and trials of this world. The 
poet's role was to provide the bridge between this world and the 
higher spiritual one that was the source of the ideal, even if he 'does 
not so much gaze up into Heaven as trace the likeness of Heaven 
upon Earth' .27 Without such an ideal the disciplinary training and 
the ideals of citizenship count for nothing. 
I have over-emphasized the similarities of John Woolley and 
Charles Badham. Woolley was a much more spiritual and tormented 
figure than Badham, with much greater warmth and humanity. 
Nevertheless there are common threads in their ideas, as one would 
expect given their backgrounds. I believe that I have demonstrated 
that their ideal of the university, the one which animated the 
University of Sydney for the first thirty years of its existence and 
beyond, cannot be reduced to the caricature of 'crime and the 
classics'. It simply does not make sense without the addition of the 
spiritual dimension and the ideal. Alongside an emphasis on 
disciplinary rigour and exemplary citizenship there stood the idea 
of the individual as a spiritual personality. 
As we have seen from Woolley's idealisation of the poet there 
was also that other bete noir of anti-humanism hovering in the 
wings-Romanticism. Just as there are links connecting the rational 
spiritual ideals of Woolley and Badham with later figures such as 
Francis Anderson so there is also a Romantic tradition associated 
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with the university. In this connection one can point to Henry 
Kendall's links with the university, to Christopher Brennan and 
his student Randolph Hughes. One finds Romanticism when the 
desire to attain the spiritual ideal, and the recognition that the ideal 
will always remain beyond human reach, overwhelms and 
submerges the citizenship and this-worldly elements of the idea of 
the university. 
The argument from history against humanism simply does not 
stand up to scrutiny. It distorts because it is only a partial account 
that cannot take seriously that human beings have ideals that cannot 
be reduced to a secular and functionalist understanding. The 
humanist ideal of the university was a reality and, for many, remains 
a reality. Even when John Anderson savaged Romanticism in the 
name of Classicism, the first step on the road to anti-humanism, he 
retained an ideal of the university that was recognisably humanist 
even if it lacked the earlier spiritual dimension. 
Of course all of this does not mean that the current anti-humanist 
attacks are without force. There are genuine weaknesses in the 
humanist ideal, and it does appear to place a great emphasis on the 
capacity of fallible human beings to be educated into recognising 
and pursuing the good. It places faith in high ideals that too often 
on closer inspection dissolve into vague hopes and longings. Anti-
humanism should be viewed as an ethical reaction against the 
perceived weaknesses of humanism, an attempt to inject an element 
of realism and intellectual toughness into what is seen as a soft, 
self-indulgent and even nihilistic outlook. But when one then 
examines anti-humanism closely one also discovers much that is 
repugnant and open to question. The picture of human nature 
presented by Ian Hunter, of Homo Bureaucraticus, is of a narrow, 
functional individual whose actions are determined by the nature of 
the institutional structure in which he or she is placed. Personally I 
have more sympathy for the Carroll variety of anti-humanism but 
Carroll provides a harsh Calvinist vision of human beings at the 
mercy of their destiny. 
My argument is that humanism and anti-humanism are tied 
together as if in a dance in which the weaknesses and deficiencies 
of the one continually provokes the emergence of the other. They 
attempt to correct each other's faults without ever really solving 
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the underlying problem which is the inability of any human ideal 
to attain universal validity. As such the recent anti-humanist attack 
on the university needs to be taken seriously but should not be 
considered as a total alternative package. It should be seen as a 
stimulus that encourages to us re-evaluate intelligently the humanist 
ideal, to consider what it has meant in the past and what it 
continues to mean today. At the same time we need to guard against 
the tendency of one set of ideas or beliefs to move to excess, as 
exemplified by the attempt of Hunter and Smith to capture the past 
and use it for their own purposes. There is a tendency in human 
affairs for one partial set of dogmas merely to be replaced by 
another set and it will be a sad day when universities become 
enslaved to the enthusiasms of the passing moment. 
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Woolley, Wordsworth and Romanticism 
GEOFFREY LfITLE * 
Melleuish writes of the humanism that lies behind Woolley's 
Romantic conception of wholeness and harmony, and of his 
equally Romantic sense of self-knowledge leading to 'an 
appreciation of the unity of humanity in all its diverse forms'. He 
notes that for Woolley, the poet was a mediator between God and 
man who 'trace[s] the likeness of Heaven upon Earth'. Melleuish 
suggests that Woolley's views in his Lectures derive from the 
Oxford of the 1830s. That is no doubt so; but there may have 
been a nearer influence upon his views of education, humanity, 
and the place of the poet. 
Woolley's language, as quoted, bears a Wordsworthian stamp. 
Before moving to the University of Sydney, from 1844 to 1849 the 
younger Woolley had been the first headmaster of Rossall School 
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